Our Gemara on Amud Beis discusses a practice of Rabbi Ami:

“When people would come before Rabbi Ami to ask about the Halacha of a thigh that was cooked with the sciatic nerve inside, he would send them before Rabbi Yitzḥak ben Ḥalov, who would rule leniently about this issue and say that it was permitted, in the name of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi. Rabbi Ami himself did not hold accordingly, but he did not wish to rule stringently for others. And the Halacha is that sciatic nerves do not impart flavor at all.”

This is an interesting dynamic where Rabbi Ami holds that something is forbidden but nevertheless sends the petitioner to another authority who he knows will be more lenient. We have a halacha that it is forbidden to assist another person or mislead another person to sin. This is based on the verse (Vayikra 19:14) “Do not place a stumbling block before a blind man.” This is not only regarding giving poor advice but also to cause another to sin via misguidance or material assistance (see Sefer HaChinuch 232, Shulchan Aruch CM 369:1, OC 163:2).

If so, how can we understand Rabbi Ami’s position? By way of metaphor, if you were a doctor and convinced that a certain treatment was harmful while another doctor believed it was helpful, would you send your best friend to the other doctor? Or, if you had a certain belief about an investment that you thought was going to go sour, would you send your best friend to a broker that had the opposite opinion? Of course not! Because you genuinely believed that you were misleading him. If so, how do we not understand Rabbi Ami’s behavior halachically and morally?

If we carefully analyze the circumstances, it is notable that he doesn’t merely say, “Rabbi Yitschok ben Chalov permits it,” rather he sends him to Rabbi Yitschok, so it is one step removed. In point of fact, he could not know for sure how Rabbi Yitschok will actually rule. However, though that technically exempts Rabbi Ami, according to the above metaphors it still does seem wrong. Or in a lomdishe approach, there are two aspects to the prohibition of placing the stumbling block in front of the blind man. One aspect is giving poor advice, another aspect is causing the person, or advising the person, to sin (see Sefer HaChinuch ibid). While Rav Ami might have exempted himself from aspect number two, he still is liable for aspect number one! After all, subjectively, he believes it is bad advice. What could be worse advice than a sin?

I believe the answer is we have the wrong metaphor. What if it wasn’t medical or investment advice where there is a distinct right and wrong? What if it was a subjective judgement, such as you were an interior decorator and you believed certain styles or designs clashed but you sent your friend to a designer whose tastes you feel matched your friend’s aesthetic preferences? When it comes to Torah, though the rabbi subjectively seeks the absolute truth, there is also recognition that there can be many aspects to the Torah, and each rabbi or judge makes a judgement subjectively which then becomes ratified as the halacha. It is a tradition that there are 70 dimensions to Torah (Sefer HaChinuch 95, Ramban Bereishis 8:4); alternatively the Ritva (Eiruvin 13b) refers to 49 sides of prohibition, and 49 sides of permissibility. Regardless, Torah is different in that the ruling is part of what makes the reality. Otherwise how would it be tenable to have a principle that certain doubts are permitted halachically but when it comes to physical danger, they are prohibited (Chulin 10a)? If there is a possibility that there is snake venom in the water, God gives you a free pass on the kashrus if the rabbi has various arguments to permit it. However, if it’s poison, though hopefully you’ll make it to Gan Eden, no matter whether it’s annulled in 60 or other halachic mechanisms, it will kill you. This is why there is a principle that health and safety issues are more stringent than halachic issues.

If so, we can understand Rabbi Ami’s rationale. The Ksav Sofer (YD 77, end of Teshuva) discusses whether it is a violation of lifnei iver to provide a cigarette to someone on Yom Tov who holds it’s permitted to smoke even though you hold it is forbidden. He ruled that it could be permitted and cites the idea that “Torah is not in Heaven.” I believe his argument is shorthand for what I explained above. Torah rulings are subjective, and “correct” from both rabbis’ points of view, so it is not “bad” advice to send to another rabbi.